Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 4

4-1-1989

The Public Dimension in Legal Education
Mark R. MacGuigan
Federal Court of Canada

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Legal Education Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research
Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark R. MacGuigan, "The Public Dimension in Legal Education" (1989) 12:1 Dal LJ 85.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Comments
Honourable Mr. Justice
Mark R. MacGuigan, P.C.*

The Public Dimension in Legal
Education

If law be not a science, a university will best consult its dignity in declining
to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best
be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it.
Christopher Columbus Langdell in 1887.1
L Introduction
Legal education, while always a subject of fascination to law students and
professors, only periodically becomes a matter of more general interest.
But that is what I believe has happened in Canada in the mid-1980s as
the result of three publishing events.
The first was the publication in 1983 of Law andLearning,the Report
to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada by
the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (hereinafter
2
referred to as the ArthursReport).
The second was the National Conference on Legal Education held in
Winnipeg, October 23-26, 1985, the proceedings of which were
3
published in part in 1987 as Legal Educationin Canada.
The third was the 1987 publication by the Osgoode Society of a
superb history of that turbulent period when legal education in Ontario
became the subject of daily newspaper headlines: The FiercestDebate:
Cecil A. Wrigh, The Benchers, and Legal Education in Ontario 19234
1957, by C. Ian Kyer and Jerome E. Bickenbach.
On the assumption that the fundamental purpose of the legal
profession, as of the law itself, is to bring about a just society, I adopt in
*Of the Federal Court of Canada.
1. Christoper Columbus Langdell "Harvard Celebration Speech" (1887), 3 L.Q.R. 123, 124.
Professor Francis A. Allen, "Humanistic Legal Education: the Quiet Crisis" in Neff Gold, ed.,
Essays on Canadian Legal Education, (Toronto, Butterworths, 1982) 9, at 10 says of this
quotation:
Dean Langdell's statement encompasses an assertion that retains a high relevance
almost a century after it was made. It is that one cannot proclaim that law studies are
appropriately included in the curricula of universities without accepting certain
necessary implications about the nature and obligations of university-based legal
education.
2. Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services, Canada.
3. Montrial, Federation of Law Societies of Canada/F&lration des professions juridiques du
Canada.
4. Toronto, Published for the Osgoode Society by University of Toronto Press.
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this article the standpoint of the public and pose the question "What does
the public have a right to expect of legal education?" S From this
perspective nothing more will need to be said of the second publication
6
above, since unfortunately it devotes small attention to this issue.
If. The Background
The earliest formal instruction in the common law was provided at the
Inns of Court in England, but, following Blackstone's first lectures at
Oxford University in 1753 (leading to his appointment to the Vinerian
Professorship in 1758), a number of other universities established chairs
in the law. Finally, in 1826, Harvard established the first university law
school. The next major advance in legal education came with the
introduction of the case method by Dean Christopher Columbus
Langdell at Harvard in 1870. Langdell's case method was based on the
belief that law was a science which could be discovered by studying
decided cases. If law was a science, the law library was its laboratory.
In Canada the first permanent common-law school was founded at
Dalhousie University in 1883 by Richard Chapman Weldon, "a man
who was clearly inspired by Harvard Law School."'7 From the beginning
the University had the co-operation of the Nova Scotia Barristers'
Society. The Society controlled the articles of clerkship and admission to
the bar, but otherwise left it to the University to provide for legal
education. Kyer and Bickenbach write that the result of this harmonious
partnership was that, by 1921, the school's second dean, Donald A.
MacRae, had "brought Dalhousie to a position of leadership in legal
education in Canada"; 8 its curriculum was recommended by the
Canadian Bar Association and served as a model for law schools
throughout the country.
Nevertheless, perhaps because it lacked financial resources, or perhaps
because of the blind adherence of the Law Society of Upper Canada to
the English system of office apprenticeship, 9 Dalhousie unfortunately
5. The public's attitude to the law in Canada was manifested at the People's Law Conferences
in 1983 and 1984, the first of which was recorded and published as The People'sLaw: What
Canadians Want from the Law (Ottawa, the People's Law Conference, 1984). These
conferences were an attempt by the Federal Government "to move beyond the perspective of
the legal profession and reach the basic concerns of those the law is intended to serve" (at 3).
The Conferences did not, of course, focus on legal education as such.
6. I should note than an earlier draft of this paper was prepared for the National Conference
on Legal Education and excerpts from it were published in Legal Educationin Canada supra,
note 3, at 174-185.
7. Kyer and Bickenbach, supra, note 4, at 28.
8. Id, at 50.
9. The history is chronicled by Kyer and Bickenbach through the life of Dean C.A. Wright.
In a recent review of the book, I wrote (CanadianHistoricalReview):"At this remove it may
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never actually set the pattern of legal education in Canada, and a
succession of able deans - MacRae himself, John Read, Sidney Smith,
and Vincent MacDonald were lured from the school to other positions.
Dalhousie's approach was emulated in some other provinces, but it was
only in 1957 that the most powerful of the law societies, the Law Society
of Upper Canada, succumbed to progress. In that year, Osgoode Hall
Law School, which had been run by the profession since its founding in
1889, became a university law school (though without a university until
its affiation with York University in 1968). As well, the Law Society
signalled its acceptance of other university law schools in the province.
Since 1957 there has been an enormous growth in the number of law
schools, law students and law professors in Canada. Including civil-law
schools, there are now 21 university law schools in the country with
about 9,500 students and over 600 law professors. The number of law
students in fact more than tripled in the years 1962-63 to 1976-77. The
increase in women law students has been particularly striking (from 5%
of all students in 1962-63 to 37% in 1980-81). This remarkable growth
levelled off in the late 1970s, though a steady demand for places has
remained.
But has this expansion been a good thing? An American law dean,
John Henry Schlegel, said of Canadian law schools in 1984:
What seems to have happened is that in merely thirty-five years the
Canadians have recapitulated American developments of over one
hundred years... and [come to] the same dead end.10

That dead end is the notion that the law is a body of definable rules: a
finite body of knowledge that is all too quickly exhausted, leaving a
dispirited faculty and a student body oriented solely to practice. But that
is running ahead of our story.
The public significance of legal education, as opposed to its
significance for the profession, the students, and the schools, has never
been a dominant theme in the assessment of legal education. An
approach to it was, however, sketched by Alfred Z. Reed in a study for
the American Bar Association in 1921, where he noted that the practice
of law is a "a public function, in a sense that the practice of other
be hard for readers to comprehend the stubbomess of the Benchers in the face of contemporary
trends in legal education, particularly in the United States.... One has perhaps to analogize to
the flag debate or to the more recent debate over the Charter to get some idea of the feelings
in play - two other debates incidentally, with similar overtones of competing British and
American influences."
10. John Henry Schlegel, "Langdell's Legacy Or, The Case of the Empty Envelope" (1984),
36 Stan. L.R. 1517, at 1527. Schlegel's chronology is a bit off - the time period in Canada
was actually 27 years.
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professions, such as medicine, is not. Practicing lawyers do not merely
render to the community a social service ... They are part of the
governing mechanism of the state. Their functions are in a broad sense
11
political".
Moreover, the public interest perspective was adopted in "a now
classic 1943 law review article"1 2 by Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal. Lasswell and McDougal argued that previous efforts to
integrate law and the social sciences had been largely unsuccessful
because of a "lack of clarity about what is being integrated, and how, and
for what purposes". 1 3 Their basic proposition was as follows:
[I]f legal education in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the
needs of a free and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious,
efficient, and systematic trainingfor policy-making. The proper function
of our law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policymakers for the ever more complete achievement of the
democratic values
14
that constitute the professed ends of American polity.
Hence, in addition to the traditional emphasis on the mastery of legal
technicalities, the Lasswell-McDougal law curriculum consisted of
"thought skills" such as of goal-thinking, trend-thinking, and scientificthinking. Furthermore, all these skills of thought needed to be
supplemented by observation skills and management skills.
Goal-thinking for Lasswell and McDougal required the clarification of
values, and had to relate general propositions to operational principles so
as not to become, in their terminology, too philosophical. Implementation of values required trend-thinking, which looks to the future and is
unswayed by current preferences. Implementation of values also required
scientific-thinking in order to direct trends, where possible by the skillful
management of the factors that condition them. Efficient training in
scientific thinking required that students become familiar with the
procedures by which facts are established through planned observation,
mostly by various forms of inference. Finally, for Lasswell and
McDougal acquaintance with methods of observation not only furnished
a sound basis for policy planning but also contributed directly to skill in
the practical management of human affairs.

11. Alfred Z. Reed, Trainingfor the Public Profession of the Law (New York, Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1921) at 3.
12. Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest" (1943), 52 Yale L. 203. The description of their
article is from Frances Kahn Zemans and Victor G. Rosenblum, The Making of a Public
Profession(Chicago, American Bar Foundation, 1981) at 9.
13. Lasswell and McDougall, id, at 204.
14. Id, at 206.
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In their 1974 report to the American Bar Foundation on American
legal education, Boyer and Cramton provided a perspective on Lasswell
and McDougal 30 years later:
With the publication of the famous article by Lasswell and McDougal
on legal education and public policy in the 1940's, thought about the
nature and function of law entered the "post-Realist period". Despite the
wide currency of the Lasswell-McDougal approach and the considerable
discussion it provoked, the concept of the lawyer as policy maker and
implementer of democratic values had only a modest influence on the total
law curriculum. At best, more emphasis was given to the policy aspects of
standard course content, and a sprinkling of seminars devoted to policy
questions were added to the curriculum. These policy courses, however,
were usually electives that were taken by only a small proportion of the
eligible law students, and their introduction was largely confined to a
handful of elite private schools until the rapid improvement of publiclysupported law schools in recent years.15
Boyer and Cramton expressed considerable frustration at this educational
wheel-spinning:
A striking as well as depressing aspect of current debates over the future
shape of the law school curriculum is the ancient lineage of many of the
major issues, and their cyclical reappearance in the literature on legal
education. Indeed, the historians remind us that the effort to integrate law
and the behavioral sciences has been going on for nearly half a century and
that "[a]rticles could be lifted out of the Law School News of 1915 and
passed off 16today as tolerably fresh ideas in the Journal of Legal
Education".
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that American legal education may
have gone as far as the predominant jurisprudential schools of recent
times allowed. Roscoe Pound and the American legal realists had their
disagreements, but they shared a distrust of all legal American absolutes
because of how they had seen them used by legal American courts to
protect vested property interests. The realists, in addition, as Jerold
Auerbach puts it "were simplemindedly devoted to empirical social
17
science research as the methodological answer to all questions".
Auerbach concludes that:
15. Barry B. Boyer and Roger C. Cramton, "American Legal Education: An Agenda for
Research and Reform" (1973-74), 59 Cornell L. Rev. 221, at 225-6. Another analysis of
Lasswell and McDougal is found in Stewart Macaulay, "Law Schools and the World Outside
their Doors: Notes on the Margins of Professional Training in the Public Interest" (1968), 54
Va. L. Rev. 617.
16. Id, at 227-8. The quotation is from Stolz, "Training for the Public Profession of the Law
(1921): A Contemporary Review", in H. Packer and J. Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal
Education(1972) 228.
17. Jerold S. Auerbach, "What Has the Teaching of Law to Do with Justice?" (1978), 53
New York U.L.R. 457, at 461. It is interesting to note that this perceptive article on legal
education is written, not by a lawyer, but by a professional historian.
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The idea of law as a public profession, with obligations that transcend
client loyalty (which, after all, must be seen in its social context: loyalty to
those who
can pay the most), seems too strong to die but too weak to
8
prevail.'
Canadians have fortunately not shared the extremes of behaviour,
controversy, and ideology that have marked the Amercian experience in
the law and legal education. Moreover, by being the better part of a
century behind in the institution of widespread legal education in
universities, we are better situated to take advantage of the perspective
which historical reflection can offer. But the greatest advantage Canadian
law schools have over those in the United States, and the reason the issues
in university legal education differ so substantially in the two countries,
is Canada's continuance of the apprenticeship tradition in articling and in
profession-run Bar admission courses. Canadian university law schools
are as a result freer to devote themselves to the more academic and
intellectual aspects of the law.
We may therefore reasonably aspire to the conceptualization and
development of a public perspective on legal education in a more
supportive professional context. It is no doubt true in Canada as in the
United States, as it was there pointed out by David Mellinkoff, that:
Lawyers as a group are no more dedicated to justice or public service
than a private public utility is dedicated to giving light. It just happens that
for a variety of personal reasons laywers ... have chosen to engage in an
occupation that more than others is "affected with a public interest"....
The profession is a public profession because as a profession it exists to
satisfy a public need. But individual lawyers are members of that public
profession to satisfy private, personal needs...19
Whatever the personal motivations of individual members of the
profession, the central truth for the profession as a whole must remain as
stated by Zemans and Rosenblum in the introduction to their 1981 study
for the American Bar Foundation:
The enormous influence that lawyers wield in both the public and the
private sectors makes their professional development of particular concern
in a democratic society. There is little doubt that the legal profession is
both ubiquitous and extremely influential in the life of the ... polity. The
prominence of lawyers in public elective and appointive office, even
considering in addition the lawyers holding numerous other government
jobs or serving as important policy advisors, represents only a part of the
political role of the bar. More pervasive and potentially more important is

18. Il, at 473.
19. David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer (St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1973) at
9.
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the public impact of the bar in its generally private role as counsellor and
advocate of private interests. 20

The public significance of legal education is thus not to be measured
simply by the role of that minority of the profession which directly
engages in public life or government administration, but rather by how
well the profession as a whole serves the public interest. In other words,
even the private-law role of the lawyer must be justified in terms of the
common good and not merely by the standard of the client's interest.
What kind of legal education is needed to prepare members of the
profession to serve the public interest? Because of the continuance of the
apprenticeship system to which I have already referred, Canadian law
schools cannot readily look to American schools for working ideals.
The Arthurs Report finds that the current ideal of legal education in
Canada, one which it finds acceptable as an ideal, but not as presently
applied, is humane professionalism. It consists of three elements: legal
rules (doctrine), legal skills (interviewing, advocacy, negotiation), and
developing a humane perspective on and a deeper understanding of the
law as a social phenomenon and an intellectual discipline. These elements
of humane professionalism are arranged in no fixed proportion or
sequence, but are all contained within an eclectic, optional curriculum.
Unfortunately, eclecticism has in the Report's view proved to be the
wrong vehicle for humane professionalism, because it has resulted in the
predominance of doctrinal teaching, which is identified with professional
formation. In the Report's view, what Canadian law schools are doing
today is not academic but professional. Despite good intentions in the
law school the professional always overwhelms the academic, which the
2
Report terms "the chosen vehicle of humane values". '
The Report argues that academic studies in law will occur only if a
distinctive academic option is created at the LL.B. level within an overall
structure of pluralism.22 This scholarly option could take many forms,
perhaps the simplest being the institution of a scholarly stream within
existing law schools.
In a perceptive review, Judge Maxwell Cohen points that the Arthurs
Report leaves unaddressed a number of difficulties. There is, first, the
sheer difficulty of ensuring the emergence of a new scholarly perspective.
20. Supra, note 12, at 1.
21. Supra, note 2, at 54.
22. It is a historical irony that although Kyer and Bichenback can rightly chronicle "Caesar"
Wright's career as a triumph of progress in legal education, they can also make the assertion
that "in many respects ... Wright created a model for the type of legal teacher and scholar that
was severely critized by the Arthurs Commission in the study Law andLearning," supra, note
4, at 276.
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Cohen notes that "even McDougal and Lasswell could not create a
'separate' stream programme within the entrenched teaching structures
- however policy-oriented they were (and are) at Yale, in the law school
generally" 23. The more general difficulty he puts more broadly:
In other words has the Arthurs Report really told us any part of the answer
to the central question raised by the Report itself, namely, even if it is
possi'ble to define with more manageable precision what is meant by
"fundamental", how shall law schools proceed to incorporate that
definition into programmes that are credible both to the social scientist and
humanist on the one side and that will be of some utility to the better
understanding and running of the legal order in its daily operational life on
the other.24
In my view, this is no more than to say that we cannot look to the
Arthurs Report for all the answers. Personally, I find persuasive its
arguments as to the necessity of a scholarly discipline of law and,
concomitantly, of the creation of the requisite conditions for such an
approach in law schools. But my concern here, the public significance of
legal education, has less to do with the emergence of a new subprofession of academic-minded lawyers (which is rightly the preoccupation of the Arthurs Report) and more with humanizing the professional
study of law for the great majority of law students who will choose not
to be legal scholars. My perspective is the totality of legal education
viewed in the public interest.
I. LegalEducation in the PublicInterest
In this respect I start from a few key assumptions or postulates. First, to
speak of society is to speak of law, since law is the principal means for
the achievement of social ends; law cannot be defined apart from these
ends, foremost among which is justice. Second, the importance to society
of law means that the public has a unique stake in law-making. Third, the
legal profession is the most influential law-making profession: even when
lawyers are not themselves the actual legislators or administrators (as
they still are in considerable part), they are the indispensable advisers of
governments, legislatures, subordinate law-makers, and administrators of
23. Maxwell Cohen, (1983), 61 Can Bar Rev. 702, at 709. Mark Weisberg, "On the
Relationship of Law andLearningto Law and Learning" (1983), 29 McGil L.U. 155, defends
traditional legal exegesis against what he feels is its depreciation in the ArthAurs Report and
charges (at 160): "The Report suggests, correctly, that we should reject the vision of law as an
autonomous system to be studied in isolation from its connection with the world. But in its
insistence on the privacy of 'law and' research it offers the opposite vision: law as totally
merged with the world. Lost in this clash of opposites is any sense of law as a partially
autonomous system."
24. Id, at 709.
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the law. They also make up the judiciary, which interprets the laws. They
can also be said to be the single most important body of policy-makers
in corporations, unions, associations, etc. in our society. Fourth, just as
the importance of law means that the public has a unique stake in lawmaking, so the importance of lawyers means that the public has a unique
stake in legal education. Fifth, the public interest demands that legal
education relate to social goals or ends as well as to means, and
particularly that it present law as the principal social means for achieving
justice.
Let us turn first to an analysis of what it is that lawyers do. A
comprehensive list of lawyers' tasks is provided by Lasswell and
McDougal:
Drafting, promoting, interpreting, and amending contitutions.
Drafting, promoting, and interpreting executive orders, administrative
rulings, municipal charters, and so on, and attacking or sustaining their
constitutionality.
Drafting and interpreting corporate and private association charters,
agreements, dispositive instruments, and so on, and attacking or sustaining
their validity.
Deciding or otherwise resolving causes or controversies, and making other
decisions which affect the distribution of values, as judges, executives
administrators, arbitrators, referees, trial examiners, and so on.
Bringing to, or obscuring from the attention of decision-makers the facts
and policies on which judgment should rest.
Advising clients on how to avoid litigation and controversies and on how
to make the best possible use of legal doctrines, institutions, and practices
for the promotion of their private purposes and long-term interest.
(Clarifying, inter alia, intentions as to property disposition, business
transactions, and family relations).
Consulting and negotiating with clients, businessmen, opposing counsel,
and decision-makers of all kinds.
Reading, digesting, and reinterpreting the decisions and reasoning of past
decision-makers of all kinds.
Guiding, conducting, and preparing for investigations and hearings
(criminal, regulatory, legislative, social-scientific, administrative).
Preparing arguments, legal forms, witnesses (ordinary, expert), trial briefs,
and so on.
Selecting courts, juries, arbitrators, negotiators, and other decision-makers.
Selecting clients.
Selecting clerks, associates and successors.
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Preparing or supervising press conferences, issuing news releases,
preparing radio material, or newsreel material.
Developing influence through participation in civic and other public
activities (organizing and directing pressure groups, lobbying propaganda,
and other control procedures) and private sociability.
Participating in professional organizations (organizations engaged in
selection, exclusion and training of members, and with the maintenance of
standards of varying degrees of ambiguity).
Contributing by investigation, writing and lecturing to legal and social
science (publishing facts and analyses of the relationship between legal
rules and human relations; reformulation of legal rules),25
Some would undoubtedly wish to add to such a list the handling of the
emotional aspects of dealing with clients. Indeed, this is one of the
26
reasons for instituting clinical legal education.
Lawyers must learn to perform their legal tasks competently. There is
therefore a great public interest in lawyers' behaviour and consequently
in legal education, which is supposed to develop professional
competence, by imparting to students the traditional knowledge and skills
of the lawyer. As Lasswell and McDougal put it:
It is the lawyer's mastery over constitutions, statutes, appellate opinions
and textbooks of peculiar idiom, and his skill in operating the mechanics
(procedure) of both governmental institutions (courts, legislatures,
administrative boards, executive offices) and private associations
(corporations, partnerships, trade associations, labour unions, consumers'
cooperatives), that set him apart from, and give him a certain advantage
over, such other skill groups in our society as diplomats, economists, social
psychologists, social historians and biologists. 27
The last thing society needs from legal education is a new class of wellintentioned but professionally unskilled social scientists. What the public
prizes about the legal profession is its professionalism, its sure sense of
craft. The public expects from lawyers such qualities as a sharp sense of
relevance, a rigorous analysis of words and concepts, and a workinghypothesis approach to synthesis - in other words, all the actionoriented techniques appropriate to maximize the possibilities for success
of any undertaking or enterprise. The lawyer is expected to be the
facilitatorpar excellence of our society.
Such a point of view is not at odds with the Arthurs Repor4 which, I
think it is fair to say, accepts the primacy of professional education, and
25. Supra,note 12, at 209-210.
26. On this point see Edward Veitch, "The Vocation of our Era for Legal Education" (1979),
44 Sask. L.R. 19 at 34.
27. Supra,note 12, at 215.
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even insists that students in the proposed scholarly stream must "be
assured that they are not forever excluding themselves from professional
opportunities".2 In fact, one of the subordinate, though important,
themes of the Report is that professional objectives themselves "are not
particularly well served by the present eclectic curriculum". 29 In
particular, the Report argues that the example of medical education
supports the desirability of establishing clinical studies in law. President
Derek Bok of Harvard has recently developed the same theme of the
inadequacy of legal education from the professional point of view:
[L]aw schools train their students more for conflict than for the gentler arts
of reconciliation and accommodation. This emphasis islikely to serve the
profession poorly. In fact, lawyers devote more time to negotiating
conflicts than they spend in the library or the courtroom, and studies show

that their bargaining efforts accomplish more for their clients. Over the
next generation, I predict, society's greatest opportunities will lie in
tapping human inclinations towards collaboration and compromise rather
than stirring our proclivities for competition and rivalry. If lawyers are not
leaders in marshalling cooperation and designing mechanisms that allow it
to flourish, they will not be at the center of the most creative social
experiments of our times.30

This is a powerful plea for a more pluralistic legal education. While there
is no need to pursue this theme here, because the profession's own interest
in technical competence is not different from that of the public, I would
observe in passing that the necessity of clinical education in university
law schools would be made more striking if there was ever any lessening
in the requirements for articling or admission to the bar, which at present
provide superior clinical experience.
However, in this paper I want to focus rather on what I believe is
unique about the public interest in legal education, i.e. that law is the
social means to the achievement of justice. This is what I call the public
dimension in legal education. It might be argued that even here, the
professional interest, rightly understood, is the same as that of the public,
but unfortunately this is not generally perceived by the Bar to be true.
Even the Holmesian "bad man" needs to know not only how to
achieve his own goals, but whether they are legally acceptable and
whether they are likely to be considered socially acceptable. A client who
28. Supra,note 2, at 142.
29. Id, at 53.
30. Derek Bok, "A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training" (1983), 33 J. Legal Ed.
570, at 582-3. At the first People's Law Conference I had occasion to say, supra, note 5, at 16:
"A legal system designed solely to regulate people's conduct is appropriate for the ideal of
confrontation. A legal system designed to respond to and secure people's needs points beyond
confrontation to cooperation."
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wishes to purchase a property which for its best commercial exploitation
requires a land use variation does not need to know merely how to go
about obtaining the variation. He or she also needs guidance as to any
foreseeable neighbourhood reaction which might either prevent his or her
obtaining it or render it largely ineffective even ff obtained.
In fact even the individual lawyer's duty to serve his or her client's
interest is coupled in the very first Rule of the Code of Professional
Conduct of the Canadian Bar Association with parallel duties to "the
31
court, members of the public and his fellow members of the profession".
Once he or she has accepted a client, of course, he or she owes that
person his or her best efforts, subject to a prior duty to the Court. He or
she may act only "within the limits of the law", and so may not, for
example, "abuse the process of the tribunal" or "knowingly assist or
permit his client to do anything which the lawyer considers to be
32
dishonest or dishonourable".
However, between clients, as it were, and as measured in the totality
of his or her professional life, the lawyer cannot shirk moral responsibility
for the kind, variety, quantity, etc. of the clients he or she accepts. He or
she is, after all, a free and responsible human being. The lawyer may
choose to refuse a client either to spend more time with family or to avoid
representing only a particular class of person. He or she may agree to
represent a client for the regular fee or out of idealism (or for both
reasons).
More important, the profession as a whole will not be seen to serve the
public interest if it appears to look only to the sum total of interests of
individual lawyers in their individual clients. The public interest requires
lawyers to defend every class of defendant, to draft and interpret laws as
well as to litigate them, to demand justice and equality for all and to
effectively mobilize social forces to achieve these goals. Legal education
31. The Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProfessionalConduct adopted by Council on
August 25, 1974. The most elaborate statement of professional ethics in Canada is found in
Professional Conduct Handbook (Toronto, Law Society of Upper Canada, 1978). The first
Rule reads: "The lawyer must discharge his duties to his client, the court, members of the
public and his fellow members with integrity."
32. The C.B.A. Rule on The Lawyer as Advocate, Chapter V!/I, id, reads as follows: "When
acting as an advocate the lawyer must, while treating the tribunal with courtesy and respect,
represent his client resolutely, honourably and within the limits of the law." The commentary
on the Rule adds, interaltr
The lawyer must not, for example:
(a) abuse the process of the tribunal by instituting or prosecuting proceedings which,
although legal in themselves, are clearly motivated by malice on the p9rt of his client
and are brought solely for the purpose of injuring the other party;
(b) knowingly assist or permit his client to do anything which the lawyer considers to
be dishonest or dishonourable...
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must ensure that every lawyer understands these public responsibilities

and that an adequate number of lawyers is motivated and indeed inspired
33

to undertake them.
I must admit that my own teaching experience has left me with a
somewhat more modest view of the pedagogical possibilities with respect
to individual students than Lasswell and McDougal appear to have. They

write, for instance, that "a legitimate aim of education is to seek to
promote the major values of a democratic society and to reduce the

number of moral mavericks who do not share democratic preferences.

'34

In my view, the proper aim of what I shall call perspective studies is

cognitive rather than affective, 35 Le, to make law students aware of both
social values (or ends) and legal means. If this also has the effect of
eliciting from students socially desireable value choices all the better, but
that is a happy result beyond pedagogical guarantee in the individual
case. 36 Nevertheless, it is absolutely essential that the overall system of

legal education be structured in such a way as to maximize the likelihood
that the social value of justice will be served as well as understood by
lawyers.

Professor Francis Allen puts the need for education in values strongly
and I believe accurately:
Law school education and research is or ought to be preoccupied with
values. We ask or ought consciously to be asking not only "how to do it"
but "why we do it" and "ought we to do it all all"? There are few
departments of the university in which such questions are so much a part
of the daily grist as the law schools. The reason why it is important that
such questions be asked is not simply that we are under obligation to be
critics of the law and its institutions. We are under that obligation, and the
33. In his monograph UnequalJusice Lawyers andSocial Change in ModernAmerica (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1976) at 12. Professor Jerold S. Auerbach defends the thesis
that
In the United States justice has been distributed according to race, ethnicity, and wealth,
rather than need. This is not equal justice. The professional elite bears a special
responsibility for this maldistribution.
He defines the professional elite as corporation lawyers and law professors recruited from
Anglo-Saxon Protestant stock. Law Professors had a modus vivendi with practitioners which
"permitted them to speak their conscience on public issues while they prephred their best
students for corporate practice" (at 155). In my view one could not analyze the role of the
professional elite so negatively in Canada, if only because Canadian society itself is probably
less economically motivated.
34. Supra, note 12, at 212.
35. On this point see Andrew Petter, "A Closet Within the House: Learning Objectives and
the Law School Curriculum", in Gold, supra,note 1,at 77.
36. Of course, different considerations are in play in courses such as legal ethics and
professional responsibility, where teachers should feel the need directly to affect each student's
future behaviour. On this, see Boyer and Cramton, supra, note 15, at 267-8, and also on the
general emotional climate of the law school, at 258-270.
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law school's role as critic of the law, and, indeed at times of the legal
profession, is one of its most important social functions. If it is
inadequately performed by the law schools, it will be performed by others;
and there is no assurance that the criticism of the others will be as
informed or as relevant. There is another reason for legal education's
concern with values, however: such concern is essential to the
understanding of law. How can law be "known" in any fundamental sense
apart from its purposes? And how can the future development of the law
be anticipated except by reference to how well these purposes are being
achieved and how acceptable they remain to the wider society as the
community's needs and perceptions change? Concern with values is thus
far from being merely of academic interest. On the37contrary, it goes to the
very essence of technical professional competence.
It is important to have a teaching staff dedicated as a whole to teaching
law with an awareness of its dimensions, beginning with legal method
itself. There are those who think the contemporary law school is doing
this badly. Basing his analysis on what he calls the total curriculum - not
only the formal curriculum but the hidden curriculum consisting of the
unarticulated views about law held by the faculty - Professor Karl Klare
argues that law schools disable their students intellectually by
overstressing both the inner rationality and coherence of the common law
and the legal reasoning contained in doctrinal analysis:
This claim about legal reasoning - that it is autonomous from political
and ethical choice - is a falsehood...
Legal reasoning exists primarily as an array of highly stylized modes of
justificatory rhetoric. From the standpoint of logic - as opposed, for
example, to the perspectives of anthropology or hermeneutics - there
simply is no necessity or determinacy to legal reasoning, no inner
compulsion to its methods. Legal reasoning is a texture of openness,
indeterminacy, and contradiction. Students need to know that in order to
work creatively as advocates and analysts. To be empowered as legal
thinkers our students must be totally freed from the tyranny of belief in the
false coherence or compellingness of legal argument. But in fact our
teaching leads ineluctably in the opposite direction, toward reinforcing the
mistaken belief that legal reasoning accounts for legal results.. .We teach
legal reasoning as though doctrine had a determinate meaning, as though
doctrinal analysis were capable of resolving cases without resort to
political and moral choice. We teach legal reasoning as though enduring
principles of social organization were embedded in the logic of the
doctrines themselves (as opposed to the political and ethical meanings of
the doctrines).38
As typically taught, legal reasoning endows with much legitimacy
what Cardozo called the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy by
37. Supra, note 1,at 14-15.
38. Karl E. Kare, "The Law School Curriculum in the 1980's: What's Left?" (1982), 32 J.
Legal Ed. 336, at 340-1.

The Public Dimension in Legal Education

which the directive force of a legal principle is exerted along the line of
logical progression, of which he writes:
It has the primacy that comes from natural and orderly and logical
succession.... At least it is the heir presumptive. A pretender to the title
will have to fight his way .... In default of other tests, the method of
philosophy must remain the organon of the courts if chance and favor are
to be excluded, and the affairs of men are to be governed with the serene
and impartial uniformity which is of the essense of the idea of law3 9
Unfortunately, this method often fails to exorcise what Cardozo
termed "the demon of formalism '40 or to deny what Holmes called "the
fallacy of logical form", 41which conceals the underlying "judgment as to
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds,...
the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding". 42 Only a public
perspective can achieve this ultimate realism.
IV PerspectiveCoursesfor Values Perspective
In my view, law must be studied as a value science rather than as a valuefree discipline. Law schools, therefore, should offer "perspective courses"
in order to cultivate in students this view of law as inescapably public and
social. Canadian law schools have improved in this respect from the mid1960s onward, according to the ArthursReport
Within the curriculum, courses offering perspectives on the legal system as
a whole increased: legal history and philosophy, law and economics or law
and society. Moreover, courses were introduced that demanded some
understanding of social context, although they were ultimately
professional in orientation: urban planning, labour relations, social welfare
or civil liberties. 43
What has occurred has been called "the law and ... ' course
phenomenon", 44 which was intended to situate legal rules in their nonlegal context. It introduces into the law a slice of real life, but a narrow
one, and of course such offerings are entirely optional.
The picture as seen by the Report therefore remains a dark one:
39. Benjamin N. Cardozo, the Nature of the JudicialProcess (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1960) at 31-6.
40. Id, at 66.
41. O.W. Holmes, "The Path of the law" in MacGuigan, Jurisprudence.Readingsand Cases,
2nd ed. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1966) at 55.
42. Id, at 54. 1 set out my own views on the judicial process in "Sources of Judicial Decision
Making and Judicial Activism," at 30-40, in Sheilah L. Martin and Kathleen E. Mahoney, ed.,
Equality andJudicialNeutrality(Toronto, Carswell, 1987).
43. Supra,note 2, at 48.
44. Rod Macdonald, "Legal Education on the Threshold of the 1980's: Whatever Happened
to the Great Ideas of the 60's" (1979), 44 Sask. L.R. 39, at 44.
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Yet our survey of teaching methods and curriculum shows that most
students receive no exposure at all to scholarly subjects such as legal
history or theory or interdisciplinary perspectives on law, and that few
have anything more than minimal exposure...45
I can only think that this is truly an unfortunate state of affairs from the
viewpoint of the public interest. On the whole, law students in Canada
are receiving negligible exposure to perspective studies. In my opinion,
the public interest demands that students be required to pursue a
minimum number of perspective courses at law school so that they can
fulfill their role as policy-makers and articulators when they become
practising lawyers. In other words, law schools must make compulsory
for every law student at least two or three perspective courses such as
legal history, jurisprudence, judicial process, legal process, law and
society, legal methods and research methods.
This is not an infallible way of assuring the protection or furthering of
the public interest, any more than the rest of the law school curriculum
provides an absolute guarantee of professional competence. But it seems
to me to be the best available protection of the public interest in the
achievement ofjustice.
V EntranceRequirements
A supplementary - and complementary - means of protecting the
public interest is ensuring that all law students are prepared to take full
advantage of the more reflective part of the law school curriculum by
having completed a more general course of studies before entering law
school. It has been an unfortunate, in my thinking, characteristic of
Canadian legal education (in comparison, say, with the U.S.) that law
schools entrants have not been required to have obtained a first degree.
Most in fact have done so, and indeed the strong preference of most
admission committees has been in this direction, but a minority of law
students even now do not have a first degree - and some law schools
even allow law students to work on a first degree course (such as a
Bachelor of Commerce degree) simultaneously. The lack of background
of this minority of students inevitably colours both their own
comprehension and that of the schools as a whole. In my view, every law
student should be required to complete a first degree as a condition of
admission.46
45. Supra, note 2, at 135.
46. I do not of course mean to suggest that students who have completed their first degree
requirements but not yet formally received their degrees before the opening of the law school
term should be denied admission. What matters is that they should have fulfilled the
requirements for the degree. Given that the percentage of first-year law students without prior
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The necessity for a first degree, which I derive from the need to serve
the public interest, might also have an advantage for the law schools in
relation to government funding. The Arthurs Report,recognizing that the
scholarly option proposed will be expensive, refers to the realistic "fear

that the professional Peter will be robbed to pay a scholarly Paul".47
Additional resources will indeed have to be found.

With a new emphasis on academics, particularly if it were to become
a second-degree program (in this respect like graduate studies), legal
education would have a ready-made case for being more heavily
"weighted" in the scheme of government funding. The present weighting

for law in Ontario is 1.5, whereas in comparable U.S. systems it is often
2.5.48 An improvment in quality in legal education must inevitably, it
seems to me, lead to an increase in weighting and hence funding. Of
course, there is no guarantee that increased funding made available to
universities on behalf of law students would necessarily find its way to the

law schools. However, given the political skills of the law faculties, it is
probably safe to assume a reasonable proportionality between increased
university funding resulting from increasing weighting for legal education
and the actual availability of increased funding for legal education.
V1.Conclusion
I have not attempted in this discussion to be definitive with respect to the

content of the perspective requirement in law schools. I have no doubt
that there are in fact several approaches which might successfully be used.

Each law school would undoubtedly develop its own approach.
What I do insist on is the right of the public to a legal education
oriented to justice as well as to law, because democracy itself demands it.
Even apart from the Charter the day has disappeared when mere
legislative fiat can confer legitimacy on law. Today the legitimacy of law
degrees seems to be no higher than about 25% of the class at any common-law school and is
as low as about 3% at some schools (this is in stark contrast to civil-law schools where as many
as 75% of the incoming students may lack first degrees), I do not believe any large number of
students will be seriously inconvenienced. But even if they were, I believe the goal of a student
body with a better preparation for a perspective approach is worth it, in terms of the overall
good. The strongest case for not requiring prior degrees is with respect to mature students who
are given special admission. Since they are in any event such a small proportion of entering
students, their admission without prior degrees would perhaps be consistent with a general rule
otherwise requiring such degrees, with their maturity constituting an acceptable substitute for
the degree requirement.
47. Supra, note 2, at 149.
48. The weighting of law students by the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission
is better than that in Ontario - 4.0, in comparison to 1.5 for arts and 3.0 for graduate studies
- but only 25% of the university budget is affected by such course weighting, the rest being
based on an entirely different kind of formula.
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is measured by the public according to its perceived adequacy in
expressing the public's conception ofjustice.
Justice itself is not objectively measurable, which is to say that it is a
value-term bearing symbolic connotations as well as a more precise
meaning. But it ought to be possible to find agreement at least on the
minimal formulation of Professor Auerbach:
Justice should be defined not only by process but by product: is 49
the result,
measured by the interests of clients and the needs of society, fair?
Law is the principal means to attain justice, and society cannot accept
a system of legal education, any more than it can tolerate a legal
profession, which does not recognize its responsibility to have as its
principal aim the achievement of justice. Such a perspective will define
the public dimension of legal education.
49. Supra,note 33, at 308.

